North Korea pivots from tourism to Russia ties amid rising isolation

North Korea’s limited reopening for the Pyongyang Marathon signals a strategic shift away from international tourism toward deeper economic alignment with Russia.

Participants run in the 31st Pyongyang International Marathon at Kim Il Sung Stadium in Pyongyang on April 6, 2025, as part of events commemorating the 1912 birth of North Korea’s founding leader Kim Il Sung. Photo by Kim Won Jin/AFP

By Anna Fadiah and Hayu Andini

When Simon Cockerell touched down in Pyongyang last month to attend the 2025 Pyongyang International Marathon, the moment carried a sense of déjà vu—but with a starkly different backdrop. As the general manager of Koryo Tours, the official travel partner for the event, Cockerell was accustomed to bringing in hundreds of foreigners. But this year, he came with only 200 international guests—a significant drop from the 700 participants in 2019.

This decline reflects more than just logistical issues. It marks a broader North Korea tourism shift, driven by tightening border controls, geopolitical realignments, and Pyongyang’s evolving priorities under Kim Jong-un.

A drastically different marathon landscape

Unlike previous editions of the marathon, which were planned and publicized nearly a year ahead, the 2025 event was confirmed just a month before race day, giving foreign participants a mere two weeks to prepare. With only one available international route—limited flights from Beijing—and just one hotel provided by North Korea’s athletic association, attendees found themselves part of an official “sports delegation” rather than regular tourists.

Travelers could still enjoy staple experiences like landmark tours and local beer tastings, but the experience was stripped of spontaneity and variety. Cockerell noted that such limitations were unprecedented, even by North Korea’s already strict standards.

From open gestures to closed borders

The Pyongyang Marathon has historically served as a rare bridge between North Korea and the outside world. But this year’s pared-down version reflects Pyongyang’s broader decision to limit foreign engagement. Experts believe this is not a temporary measure, but a permanent pivot—a strategic decision that reveals deeper political and economic shifts.

Dr. Rüdiger Frank, head of the European Centre for North Korean Studies, pointed out that the costs of tourism—from security concerns to unpredictable visitor behavior—have started to outweigh its benefits. “It seems North Korean decision-makers have come to realise that,” he said.

The country's limited experiment with reopening its borders in February—allowing non-Russian visitors into the northeastern city of Rason—lasted just three weeks before access was abruptly shut down again. No official explanation was offered.

Strategic reorientation toward Russia

This North Korea tourism shift cannot be fully understood without examining its deepening ties with Moscow. Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Pyongyang’s borders have remained closed to nearly all foreigners. But in early 2024, Russian nationals began gaining access. That change coincides with an increasingly open economic and military partnership between North Korea and Russia.

Russian tourists prepare to board buses after arriving at Pyongyang International Airport in Pyongyang on February 9, 2024. Photo by Kim Won Jin/AFP

Pyongyang’s recent confirmation that its troops are supporting Russian forces in Ukraine underscores the depth of this alliance. According to analysts, the financial windfall from arms exports and other cooperation far exceeds the estimated $90 million to $175 million North Korea once earned annually from tourism.

“The Russians have made it pretty clear that they don’t care about sanctions,” said Rachel Minyoung Lee, a senior fellow at 38 North. She emphasized that Kim Jong-un is leveraging this opportunity not only for short-term profits but also to build a lasting alliance that reduces dependency on China.

Deteriorating ties with China

Beijing, once Pyongyang’s top trading partner and main diplomatic supporter, appears to be losing influence. Before 2020, Chinese tourists made up around 90 percent of all international visitors to North Korea. Today, however, Chinese nationals are still barred, even as Russians are welcomed.

This reversal reflects North Korea’s broader realignment. Lee believes the strategic partnership signed with Russia in 2024 is aimed at diversifying economic and political dependencies, with Belarus also emerging as a possible partner. The Belarusian foreign minister’s recent trip to Pyongyang, focused on cooperation in healthcare and agriculture, and rumors of a future visit by the Belarusian president, underscore this shift.

Rason's brief reopening and rapid closure

The short-lived reopening of Rason also illustrates Pyongyang’s skittishness toward uncontrolled exposure. Within three weeks of allowing non-Russian foreigners into the special economic zone, North Korea slammed the gates shut again.

A video posted by British influencer Mike O’Kennedy—highlighting empty streets and decaying buildings—went viral shortly before the closure. While tour operators deny that such content was the direct cause, they acknowledge a growing number of content creators joining North Korean trips.

On a recent visit by China-based Young Pioneer Tours, around half of the guests were influencers, according to company co-founder Rowan Beard. This marked a dramatic shift from pre-pandemic tours, which rarely included such high numbers of content creators.

“They don’t work for news agencies, but their documentation of trips still resembles journalism,” Beard said. Given North Korea’s near-total control over its internal narrative and its long-standing suspicion of independent reporting, this trend is unlikely to be welcomed.

Domestic tourism as a fallback?

As international tourism dries up, North Korea appears to be turning inward. Dr. Frank estimates that about 7 million North Koreans—roughly a quarter of the population—now belong to a nascent middle class with disposable income and interest in leisure activities.

A major litmus test for this hypothesis will be the long-delayed Wonsan-Kalma resort. Initiated in 2014 as part of Kim’s tourism development push, the beachfront complex includes hotels, entertainment centers, and a water park. Satellite imagery indicates that it may finally open next month, and expectations are that it will cater primarily to domestic tourists.

Still, some experts are doubtful. Lee from 38 North believes internal demand alone won’t be sufficient to replace the revenue and exposure international tourism once provided.

Tourism loopholes and the future outlook

Despite Pyongyang’s apparent disinterest in reviving traditional tourism, tour companies are attempting to find workarounds. Young Pioneer Tours plans to bring a delegation to the upcoming Pyongyang Trade Fair using business visas. But such arrangements are more expensive, more limited, and less accessible to average travelers.

Beard says officials on the ground are simply “not interested” in resuming tourism soon. Cockerell, too, adopts a cautious tone. “It may open again tomorrow. Who knows?” he said, noting that North Korean officials often respond to tourism inquiries with the phrase “maybe sometime in the future.”

The North Korea tourism shift is part of a broader strategic reorientation that privileges political alignment and security over economic openness. While the country once saw tourism as a tool for soft diplomacy and revenue, that vision now appears obsolete.

With military and economic ties to Russia deepening, and relations with China cooling, North Korea’s future looks increasingly insular. For now, foreign travelers can expect few opportunities—and plenty of ambiguity—when it comes to crossing Pyongyang’s tightly controlled borders.