Trump’s Eurasian strategy reshapes U.S. foreign policy amid rising China-Russia axis

Trump’s return marks a shift from globalism to territorial power politics as new books warn of autocratic dominance in Eurasia.

President Donald Trump speaks to graduates at the University of Alabama's Coleman Coliseum on May 1, 2025, in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

By Anna Fadiah and Hayu Andini

In his second inaugural address, President Donald Trump proclaimed a dramatic turn in the nation’s identity. “The United States will once again consider itself a growing nation,” he declared in January, calling for a return to expansionism and asserting that America would “carry our flag into new and beautiful horizons.” While critics dismissed his musing about retaking the Panama Canal or acquiring Canada or Greenland as unserious, Trump’s Eurasian strategy reveals a more consequential shift in geopolitical thinking — one that blends territorial ambition with isolationist instincts.

The impact of this vision reaches far beyond American borders. As Trump reasserts territorial priorities, a broader reconfiguration of global power is underway. The Trump Eurasian strategy — a focus on geographic control, particularly across the vast Eurasian landmass — is intertwined with rising cooperation between China and Russia. This reawakening of geopolitical competition is documented in three compelling books that chart the contours of an emerging global order rooted in space, borders, and old-school power politics.

Books trace the return of geography in global affairs

Hal Brands, Geoff Raby, and Zack Cooper each offer timely insights into the changing global landscape. Together, their works depict a world in which Trump’s focus on geography is not an aberration but part of a wider reversion to past power structures.

In The Eurasian Century, Hal Brands argues that the center of global power has historically rested in Eurasia — and that the 21st century will be no different. He draws on the legacy of thinkers like Sir Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Nicholas Spykman to explain why dominance over the Eurasian landmass has always been crucial to global supremacy. Brands emphasizes that the world wars and the Cold War were, at their core, contests over Eurasia. Today, he warns, the U.S. faces a renewed threat from an autocratic China-Russia axis that is poised to exploit America’s waning global engagement.

Geoff Raby’s Great Game On narrows the scope to “Core Eurasia” — the region encompassing the five Central Asian republics, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. He likens current dynamics to the 19th-century Great Game between Britain and Russia, but with China now assuming the dominant position. Raby portrays Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative as a modern strategy to stabilize China’s western frontier while extending its influence deep into Eurasia. Through strategic investment and security control, China has crafted a new geopolitical zone Raby dubs “Sinostan.”

Zack Cooper’s Tides of Fortune introduces a structured model for understanding great power behavior. His four-phase framework suggests that rising powers — like China — evolve from defensive postures into global assertiveness. Drawing from the U.S.’s rise in the 19th century and Russia’s post–Cold War decline, Cooper illustrates how military strategies and self-perceptions of power follow predictable patterns. His analysis directly parallels current tensions between the U.S. and China and recommends a U.S. strategic shift toward technological and defensive innovation.

Geography, autocracy, and coalition politics converge

A key theme in these books — and in the Trump Eurasian strategy — is the central role of geography in determining political fate. For Brands, Eurasia is the “fulcrum of world order.” The logic is straightforward: a power that controls Eurasia gains access to unparalleled resources, population, and strategic position. Brands illustrates how Mackinder’s “heartland theory,” Mahan’s maritime strategy, and Spykman’s “rimland theory” continue to influence modern geopolitics.

Brands also draws attention to ideologues like Alexander Dugin, a Russian ultranationalist who advises Vladimir Putin and espouses similar geographic determinism. The danger, according to Brands, lies in a Eurasia dominated by autocracies. Without U.S. involvement, he warns, Europe risks becoming a “democratic toehold in a Sino-centric supercontinent.”

Raby diverges from this dire outlook. While he acknowledges China’s expanding power, he adopts a more sympathetic view, describing Chinese actions as responses to historical vulnerabilities. Rather than confront Beijing, Raby advocates for a U.S.-China “grand bargain” that accepts China’s central role in global governance.

This position is sharply contested by Brands and Cooper. Both stress the importance of coalitions to counterbalance autocratic power. Brands suggests that the U.S. must pragmatically align with regimes like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam to check the Russia-China bloc. Cooper, meanwhile, emphasizes technological deterrence, calling for innovations such as drone warfare to preserve U.S. power in the Pacific.

Historical echoes and Trump’s evolving posture

One of the more intriguing aspects of Cooper’s theory is the historical parallel he draws between a rising U.S. in the late 19th century and today’s China. In both cases, the emerging power avoided direct confrontation with the dominant navy of the era. Instead, the U.S. adopted guerrilla naval tactics against Britain; now, China has done the same to avoid provoking the U.S. navy. As China transitions to global projection, the U.S. must adapt — not by doubling down on power projection, but by shifting to a more defensive, technologically advanced stance.

Mahan’s influence is central to this narrative. His vision of American maritime power and advocacy for the Panama Canal helped position the U.S. as a global naval force. Trump’s own focus on Panama and Greenland, and his apparent disregard for Taiwan, may reflect an intuitive return to Mahan-like thinking — albeit filtered through his “America First” lens.

Where earlier presidents viewed the U.S. as a global guarantor of liberty, Trump appears more inclined to retrench. This could mark a historic shift in U.S. posture — away from defending democracy abroad and toward preserving power closer to home. Franklin Roosevelt’s warning that the U.S. cannot be an “oasis of liberty surrounded by a cruel desert of dictatorship” may soon be put to the test.

Eurasian realignments and America’s global role

Each author provides a different vision of what comes next. Brands and Cooper emphasize the urgency of confronting the Russia-China axis. Raby sees opportunity in accommodation, even arguing that Europe might lure Russia away from China in a “reverse Kissinger” move that repositions Russia within Europe’s orbit. Yet this suggestion, especially amid Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, appears politically implausible for now.

Still, all three books agree that the U.S. remains pivotal. Whether through military coalitions, technological deterrence, or diplomatic bargains, America’s choices will shape Eurasia’s future. The Trump Eurasian strategy, however erratic it may seem, is therefore not just about symbolism or spectacle. It’s about reimagining America’s place in a world where space — not ideology — is once again the measure of power.

As Trump continues to rethink America’s international role, and as the China-Russia partnership deepens, the geopolitical game is once again being played across the great landmass that spans from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Eurasia, long the battlefield of empires, may now determine the future of the 21st century — and America’s role in it.